Heavy fighting in the South Sudanese capital of Juba over the past few days has led to hundreds of deaths and the suggestion that the country is “back to war”. The question on everyone’s lips has been: who is behind the violence?
| South Sudan President Salva Kiir. (File, AFP) |
This question is all the more curious given that President Salva Kiir
and First Vice-President Riek Machar have both seemed incapable of
explaining what’s happening. In fact, the leaders of the main rival
factions in the recent civil war were together for a meeting when one of the episodes of gunfire occurred.
Missing
from the meeting, however, was the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA) chief of general staff. The former governor of Northern Bahr
El Ghazal state, Paul Malong, is a figure who many see as the true
power behind the Salva Kiir’s presidential throne.
The power behind the throne
I have written about Malong and Kiir’s relationship
before. And I have come to the unsurprising conclusion, as have many
South Sudanese, that Malong is the one who holds the real power.
Malong established his authority over Northern Bahr El Ghazal and the SPLA during the civil war
that spanned from 1983 to 2005. In this period, Malong dominated the
local war economy and used its proceeds to cement strategic allegiances.
He did this through the practice of large-scale polygamy and by
godfathering his supporters’ marriages, a practice shared by other Nuer commanders in Unity state, for example.
One
of Malong’s supporters was Salva Kiir. Malong provided financial
support after Kiir fell out with then SPLA leader John Garang in 2004.
One illustration of Malong’s influence is that he recently offered to
pay for the bride wealth for Kiir’s new wife. That role is traditionally
taken up by a groom’s father and his close and extended kin. In 2005,
after Garang’s death, Kiir took over as vice-president of Sudan. And in
2008, Malong was appointed state governor of his home area of Northern
Bahr El Ghazal.
In the following few years, as episodes of
fighting with Sudanese forces continued, Malong managed to convince Kiir
of the need to create a militia that would be loyal to them both. He
began recruiting and training men from Kiir’s home state of Warrap, but
the majority were from Northern Bahr El Ghazal.
Malong was trying to position himself as the first leader from Northern Bahr El Ghazal with national stature. The militia he led came to be known as Mathiang Anyoor, meaning “brown caterpillar” in Dinka. But it was also known as Dot ku Beny or Gel-Beny or “rescue the president”.
Lethal power and lame ducks
In December 2013, war broke out
in now-independent South Sudan. It began as a political battle between
President Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, and Vice-President Machar, an ethnic
Nuer. Much of the violence soon became codified along these ethnic lines
despite the fact that military alliances did not always follow strict
lines.
As the fighting progressed, Malong – with the help of the Mathiang Anyoor – organised
the massacre of thousands of ethnic Nuer in Juba. Soon after, he was
promoted to chief of general staff of the SPLA and he came to dominate
the entire SPLA system of corruption. The proceeds were invested
strategically to sustain military allegiances, both within and outside
the SPLA.
Since then, Malong has continued to recruit young men in
what has become known as the “new” Mathiang Anyoor. And both “new” and
“old” Mathiang Anyoor have been used to reinforce the SPLA in Upper
Nile, Unity and Jonglei states. But Malong’s influence goes even
further. The Dinka commando units that have wrought havoc on Western and
Central Equatoria states since October 2015 – despite the signing of a peace agreement between Kiir and Machar in August 2015 – also reportedly answer to Malong.
It
is understood that the power he commands has led to rifts with Minister
of Defence Kuol Manyang. In contrast to Malong, the influence of South
Sudan’s official main leaders appears to be weak. The recent fighting in
Juba and Kiir’s apparent ignorance
of what was happening reveals his lack of control over the SPLA. And it
is increasingly clear that the president has lost a great deal of
credibility and power amidst rumours of alcoholism and health issues.
If
Kiir is a lame duck, the same might be said – albeit to a lesser extent
– of Riek Machar. The first vice-president never seemed to control his
troops and never had as much military gravitas as his peers in the
so-called SPLM-In-Opposition (IO). Furthermore, he has made the grave
mistake of dismissing IO’s most experienced generals in the past year.
International powers to blame, too
With
fighting returning to South Sudan despite an internationally brokered
peace agreement less than a year ago, the international community must
also take some responsibility:
- Juba’s demilitarisation took the form of a 25km radius around the city. Why was the SPLA allowed to encircle the capital while blocking possible escape routes for IO?
- And why was a stronger stance not taken regarding the fact that SPLA soldiers had clearly removed their uniforms but remained inside Juba?
- Why was the national security body allowed to expand exponentially over the past few months without action?
If
anything, the recent violence in Juba has shown how easy it is for the
SPLA to breach security arrangements. The heavy fighting on July 10 and
11 suggest that the situation might become even worse than when civil
war began in December 2013. Fighting engulfed different parts of the
city. Rocket-propelled grenades were fired. Civilian houses were
shelled. Government helicopter gunships circled Juba’s skies. And United
Nations (UN) premises were hit.
The Juba bridge was also closed
off and Machar’s troops were unlikely to back down since they knew there
was no way out, especially with Malong’s commando units able to attack
them easily from their bases in Central Equatoria. Machar’s troops and
SPLA forces were fighting right outside UN premises and reports emerged
that Nuer generals, who had remained allied to the SPLA but were now
being targeted by SPLA soldiers, were asking for shelter inside the UN
compound.
Real threat for unarmed civilians
Reports
also emerged that both sides had started inflicting reprisals on
civilians. On the evening of July 11, Kiir and Machar declared a
ceasefire. The question throughout the fighting – still valid should the
war in Juba resume – has been: who will protect the civilians?
Many
believe that Malong is the one behind the recent events and point to
the fact that on July 8, SPLA troops around J1, the presidential palace,
were reinforced from both the area surrounding Juba and from Luri, a
cattle camp where Mathiang Anyoor recruits stayed before the 2013 Juba
massacre.
Malong did make a statement
on July 9 saying the situation in Juba was under control. But this was
done through an intermediary and it was not clear where the man himself
was. At any rate, it is difficult to imagine the SPLA could have
decimated Machar’s bodyguards on July 8 without the top orders coming
from its chief of general staff.
There are rumours that Malong
intended to wreak havoc and maybe even take control of Juba. He may also
split from Kiir, but either way he would retain control over his Dinka
militias, who are spread all over the Equatorias, as well as over some
of the Bul Nuer fighters, who are based in Unity state and have close
ties with Khartoum.
Malong will also continue cultivating his
popularity with Dinka communities who do not want to relinquish their
desire for their own state, especially after Kiir opened a Pandora’s box
with his unilateral decree in October 2015 to replace South Sudan’s ten states with 28.
Depending
on whether or not the ceasefire holds, and on who is officially blamed
for the recent fighting, Malong may open up a new front, most likely
from Northern Bahr El Ghazal. If such a war were to begin, Kiir might
break with Malong to save himself and be forced to mend fences with
Machar’s IO as well as other victimised ethnic groups.
Much
remains uncertain. But the future of South Sudan looks grim – and not
just in Juba. Other state capitals have seen troop movements and even
some fighting.
Just five years after independence, and less than
one year after a peace agreement was signed, a new phase of South
Sudan’s civil war seems to have begun.
News24
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